I study international relations, focusing on statecraft, the causes and consequences of arms transfers and the relationship between political science and policymaking.
My dissertation, Strategies of Manipulation in the Delegation of Power Politics, examines how states solve agency problems in the context of military capacity building. I argue that states prevent their partners from misusing transferred capability by preemptively manipulating the threats they confront, the balance of power in which they operate and the capabilities they possess.
I’ve developed and taught three courses for Stanford undergraduates and International Policy Studies Master's students on international relations theory and evidence-based foreign policy design. I previously worked in the U.S. government (State, DHS, Congress) and occasionally indulge in political philosophy.
PhD Candidate in Political Science Stanford University
Carnegie IPSCON Predoctoral Fellow Kissinger Center for Global Affairs Johns Hopkins SAIS
MPhil in Politics University of Oxford
AB in Politics Princeton University